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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
March 1, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester 
Dear Chief: 
My tentative vote in this case is to 
affirm with respect to Jefferson, McLennan, 
Tarrant and Galveston Counties and to reverse 
with respect to Lubbock, El Paso and Nueces. 
Also, perhaps there should be a remand as to 
Travis County. 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to Conference 






JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.iu:p-rtntt <.!fcurl ttf tlrt 'Jniitb .itzdtg 
jta:~ftingttttt. '!9. <!f. 2ll~'-1~ 
March 3, 1975 
No. 73-1462 White v. Regester 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE : 
In accord with the suggestion at Friday's Conference, 
I have prepared this memorandum on the question of our 
jurisdiction. Under § 1253 this depends, of course, on 
whether this was a case "required • • • to be heard and 
determined by a district court of three judges." 
On the first appeal, White v. Regester, 413 U.S. 755, 
we held that the original case was one requiring three judges 
because the plaintiffs had sought an injunction against the 
statewide redistricting plan on the ground of impermissible 
population variances. Although the District Court had granted 
only declaratory relief on the statewide issue, we had 
appellate jurisdiction because the court had granted an 
injunction against the multimember districts in Dallas and 
Bexar counties. Because the court's order therefore was 
literally one granting an injunction in a case required to 
be heard by three judges, our jurisdiction was established 
and the opinion did not inquire whether the challenge to 
multimember districts by itself would have required a three-
judge court. 
Following our reversal on the statewide redistricting 
issue, the plaintiffs (joined by intervenors) resumed their 
quest _ for an injunction against the nine remaining multi-
member districts on the ground that each diluted the voting 
strength of minorities. No other issue was left in the case. 
The prayer for injunctive relief would require a three-judge 
court under § 2281 only if it was an attack on a statute of 
statewide application • ......__ 
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Moody v. Flowers, 387 U.S. 97, held that a state statute 
providing a distr1ct1ng scheme for the selection of members 
of a county governing body was not a statute of statewide 
application for purposes of § 2281, despite the existence of 
similar statutes applying to other counties. Id. at 102. 
Companion cases decided with Moody are consistent in principle. 
In Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105, the Court 
held that a Michigan statute prescribing a uniform method 
of selection for all county school boards was a statute of 
statewide application. But in Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112, 
the Court held that a statute prescribing the method of 
selecting the county governing board for Princess Anne 
County, Virginia, was not a statute of statewide application. 
Board of Regents v. New Left Education Project, 404 U.S. 
541, extended Moodt v. Flowers to cover rules issued by a 
state-level body a fecting more than one locality within the 
State. Because the Board of Regents of the University of 
Texas system governed only a few of the state's college 
campuses, the Court held that its rules were not rules of 
statewide application even though the affected campuses were 
located in different parts of the state. In a footnote the 
Court distinguished a summary affirmance finding jurisdiction 
in Alabama State Teachers Assn. v. Alabama Public School and 
College Authority, 393 U.S. 400, saying that although the 
"legislative direction" in that case directly tapplied only 
to the issuance of bonds for one college in Alabama, it was 
expressive of an official statewide policy of maintaining a 
racially identifiable, dual system of higher education. 
I believe Moody and New Left furnish the basis for 
holding that this case was not one required to be heard by 
three judges. The state statute at issue, reproduced in the 
Juris. Stmt. Appx. at 113B-146B, makes separate provision for 
each legislative district. There was no uniform policy of 
using multimember districts in all urban areas: for example, 
the Redistricting Board created single-member districts in 
Harris County (Houston), the most populous county in the state. 
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, establishes beyond question 
that the use of multimember districts is not phr ~ unconstitu-
tional. Consequently, the plaintiffs' claim t at these 
districts minimize the voting strength of minorities must 
stand or fall on facts peculiar to each district. The record 
in this case demonstrates how intensely local and varied 
these facts can be. 
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Arguably this case can be distinguished from Moody v. 
Flowers, by the fact that it involves the members of state 
legislature rather than of a local governing body. The 
state at large undoubtedly has more interest in the selection 
of members of its state legislature than it has in the 
selection of local officers, but the nature of its interest 
is different from that motivating the three-judge require-
ment. A decree invalidating one or more multimember districts 
does not frustrate statewide policy to the extent that may 
occur when a federal court declares a state regulatory statute 
unconstitutional. The effect is local, especially if (as 
I believe) the court's decree must be limited to prospective 
relief. The decree would notUMeat any legislators or 
invalidate any action of the current legislature; it would 
simply change the method of choosing legislators within a 
particular district at future elections. That it involves 
several districts rather than only one is irrelevant under 
New Left, at least as long as there is no uniform state policy 
such as that in Alabama State Teachers Assn., which would 
be nullified by a decree against any one of the districts. 
For me, at leas~ a further reason for holding that 
three judges were not required in this case is the difficulty 
this Court will have in making an intelligent appellate review 
of factual issues which are essentially local and often turn 
on subjective ~udgments (e.g. whether legislators have been 
appropriately 'responsiverr to minority group needs). This 
is quite unlike the usual three-judge case in which the 
central issue is rarely so fact-specific. Deciding that 
these cases must be taken in the usual manner would be 
consistent, I think, with the policy of minimizing our 
responsibility for first-line appellate review. 
Nor do I think such a ruling in this case would fore-
shadow a similar result in a redistricting case. A suit 
challenging reapportionment on grounds of impermissible 
population variance is different from this case, both in 
theory and practical effect, from a suit challenging multi-
member districts on a claim of discrimination against minorities. 
The issue in a Baker v. Carr suit is whether one or more 
districts are over-represented (or under-represented) by 
comparison t o other districts within the state. Even if 
only one district is off the norm, the alleged discrimina-
tion is statewide. Any relief granted to the plaintiff must 
affect more districts than one. A challenge to a multimember 
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district, however, is essentially local. I believe, therefore, 
an opinion could be written in this case that would not alter 
the usual course of proceeding by three-judge courts in cases 
that allege impermissible population variance among districts. 
For these reasons, I adhere to the view that the proper 
disposition of the case is to vacate the judgment and remand 
for entry of a fresh decree so t hat the parties can take an 
appeal to CAS • 
t .1 if. 
L. F .P., Jr. 
ss 
I 
.§ttprmtt <!Jattrl of iltt 'Jlfui±tlt .§tlrdts-
~ag lfinghrn, gl. <!}. 2ll~J!. ~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTI CE POT T E R S TEWART 
March 4, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester 
I agree with Lewis that the proper disposition of this 
case is to vacate the judgment and remand to the district 
court for entry of a fresh decree so that there can be a timely 
appeal to the court of appeals. Lewis, in his memorandum of I 
today, has stated my reasons for that view better than I could 
have done, and I have nothing to add. 
If I reached the merits in this case, which I do not 
expect to do, my tentative views would coincide with those 
expressed by Byron. That is, I would tentatively affirm with 
respect to Jefferson, McLennan, Tarrant, and Galveston 
Counties, and to reverse with respect to Lubbock, El Paso, 





JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
Dear Chief: 
~u:p-rtut.t ~om! ttf tltt 'Jltttili~ ~nata­
- aa-!p:ttgttttt. lfl. ~· 2ll.;t'l-.;t 
March 5, 1975 
Re: No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester 
I definitely feel that we have jurisdiction in this case, and 
I would dissent from a holding that we do not. 
On the merits, I am still inclined to adhere to my vote at 
Conference, that is, to affirm. With respect to one or two of the 
districts, my feeling is not so firm that I would dissent if a majority 
is inclined to reverse. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
~jz.£/7s-
' _'•· ~- # ,; 4 
~~···., 
- ~~. .. ~ 
~. ' 
"". 
.§ttpreme ~01trt of tlte ~tnitdt ,;%Jtnies 
11'Jn.s frhtgton, p. <!J. ZO,(; Jl-~ 
CHAM BERS Of" 
JUST ICE WM . J . B R E NNAN, JR. May 21, 1975 
RE: No. 73-1462 White v. Regester 
Dear Byron: 
If your Memorandum becomes the Court 
opinion, will you please add the attached 
at the foot thereof. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc. The Conference 
/ 
RE: No. 73-1462 White v. Regester 
Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part. 
I join Part I of the Court's opinion and concur in 
the affirmance of the judgment of the three-judge court 
as respects Tarrant, Jefferson and Galveston counties. I 
dissent however from the reversal of the judgment with re-
spect to Nueces County and the vacation of the judgment 
with respect to El Paso, Travis, Lubbock and McLennan 
counties. I do not think that our ability to appraise the 
factual circumstances with respect to those counties can 
possibly equal the informed approach that the three-judge 
court brought to .the int~icacies of the respective situa-
tions, political and otherwise, in the several counties. 
We ought accept the judgment of the three-judge court -
as we did as respects Dallas and Bexar counties in Regester I, 
and as we do today as respects Tarrant, Jefferson and Galves-
ton counties - as a "blend of history and an intensely local 
appraisal of the design and impact of the ..• multi-member 
district [of each county] in the light of past and present 
reality, political and otherwise." Regester I, at 769-770. 
I would affirm the judgment of the three-judge court in its 
entirety. 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
-
~u:punu ~ltltrl of tlyt~b .§fahg 
,rag!pnghm. ~. <!f. 2UbtJ!.·~ . 
May 21, 1975 
No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester 
Dear Byron, 
In view of the telegram from 
Regester's counsel, I agree that we should 
not waste any more time on this case, at 
least for now. Unfortunately, it was your 
time that was wasted -- in the preparation 
of your very thorough memorandum. 
Perhaps, as Felix Frankfurter used to say, 
you can now put the memorandum in a 





Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~ttprttttt argud of tlrt ~nittb ~httt~ 
Jlllllltittg~ ~. <If. 2.(l~)!.~ 
May 21, 1975 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester 
Mike Rodak has just given me the following memorandum 
and I suggest we not waste any more time on the matter: 
"From Austin, Texas, and signed by David R. 
Richards, attorney for Regester, et al. 
"This wire is to confirm our telephone conversa-
tion of this date concerning White v. Regester, 
No. 73-1462. It would appear that the subject 
matter of this litigation will be shortly 
rendered moot. The Texas House of Representa-
tives has adopted legislation creating single 
member legislative districts for all counties 
involved in this litigation. The bill is to be 
considered by the Texas Senate on Friday and 
will be presumably adopted and there is every 
reason to believe that the bill will be signed 
by the Governor before the legislature adjourns 
June 2, thereby eliminating all remaining multi-
member legislative districts in Texas." 
May 22, 1975 
No. 73-1462 White v. Regester 
Dear Byron: 
I also have a memorandum in the New Jersey Lottery case 
which I am saving to send "to a friend". 
Connniserations. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
LAW OFFIC ES OF 
DON·GLADDEN 
RECEIVED 
JIJN 1 t> 197 5 
OffiCE Of HIE. C\J.Ri\ 
~rJ.~r. u.~ 
702 UUUK DUHNKTT BUILUINO 
FORT WORTH. TEXAS 76102 




Honorable :Hichael Rodak, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
·1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
June 13, 1975 
/ 
RE: White vs. Regester 
No. 73-1462 
We have received a copy of Mr. David Richards letter of 
June 12, 1975, directed to . you relative to the above case. 
It would appear that the difference of view between the 
attorneys for other parties plaintiff and our office is one perhaps 
of semantics rather than law. It is our position that the consti-
tutional question in the litigation is whether or not the various 
plaintiffs have been denied equal access to the political processes, 
rather than the means by which such denial is accomplished. We 
feel that the action taken by the Texas Legislature may not have 
resolved the issue and render moot the question in the case. 
We realize that if Governor Briscoe signs HB 1097 or fails to 
veto it by June 22, 1975, that the facts before the Supreme Court 
are not sufficient to determine whether or not the new districts 
created by the legislature resolve the complaint of the parties 
plaintiff. 
I 
In any event we do concur that upon HB 1097 becoming law the 
Supreme Court should remand the case back to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
I am forwarding a copy of this letter to all counsel of record. 




cc: All Counsel of record 
SAM HOUSTON CLINTON, JR . 
DAVID R. RICHARDS 
LAW OFFICES 
CLINTON & RICHARDS 
600 WEST 7TH STREET , 
AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701 
June 12, 19 75 
AR EA CODE 5 12 
4 76 ·4822 
Hon. Michael Rodak, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
JUN 13 1~l7S 
OFfiCE OF THE CLeRK 
ts!JPREME COU:n, U.0. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Rodak: 
RE: White v. Regester 
No. 73-1462 
This letter is to confirm the contents of our telephone 
conversation of this date regarding the current status 
of legislative reapportionment by the Texas Legislature. 
I am enclosing a copy of House Bill 1097 in the form 
which it passed the Texas Legislature and now awaits 
the Governor's signature. You will note that the bill 
passed tbe House on May 7 by a vote of 103 yeas and 29 
nays and passed the Texas Senate on May 28, 1975, by a 
vote of 30 yeas and 1 nay. This bill, along with many 
others passed in the closing days of the Texas Legis-
lature, are awaiting th'e Governor's . signature. Under 
the terms of Article 4 Section 14 of the constitution 
of tile State of Texas the Governor has 20 days from the 
date of adjournment to act upon the legislation. The 
Legislature adjourned June 2 and the Governor must act 
by June 22, 1975. Thus the Governor must either sign 
the bill or veto it before June 22 or it will become law 
on June 22. 
From a purely practical point of view there is absolutely 
no reason to think that the Governor will veto House Bill 
1097. It passed overwhelmingly in both houses of the 
Legislature and there has been no expressed opposition 
to the bill becoming law. Governor Briscoe has been in 
attendance at the Governor's Conference in New Orleans 
for much of the time since the Legislature adjourned and 
House Bill 1097, along with a number of other bills, await 
his signature, presumably next week. 
By its terms House Bill 1097 creates single member legisla-
tive districts in each of the counties under consideration, 
·~· 
Hon. Michael Rodak, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
June 12, 19 75 
Page Two 
to wit: Jefferson, Galveston, Tarrant, McLennan, Travis, 
Nueces, Hidalgo, El Paso and Lubbock, and there are no re-
maining multi-member legislative districts. 
Furthermore, Section 5 of the bill specifically supersedes 
the Legislative Redistricting Act of the Legislative Redis-
tricting Board of Texas. It was, of course, the Act of the 
Legislative Redistricting Board of Texas which has been the 
subject matter of this litigation from the outset. 
It is the unanimous view of the attorneys associated in the 
brief on behalf of the Plaintiffs Regester, Moreno, Chapman, 
Wright and Warren that this action of the Legislature renders 
moot the questions in the case as it now pends before the 
United States Supreme Court. We recognize that this view is 
apparently not shared by Mr. Gladden who represents the 
Plaintiff Escalante. 
If it is not presumptuous, we suggest that it would seem 
appropriate to follow the practice employed in Diffenderfer v. 
Cehtral Baptist Church of Miami, 404 U.S. 412 (1972) and vacate 
the judgment of the district court and remand to the district 
cour~ - to ·permit any Plaintiffs, who chose, to amend their 
pleadings, if any chose to attack the newly enacted legisla-
tion. In all events, it is our vie\v that the matter has been 
rendered moot by legislative action, and that final confirma-
tion of this mootness will be forthcoming upon the Governor's 
signing House Bill 1097. In this connection I will notify 
you immediately upon any action being taken by the Governor 
in connection with House Bill 1097. 
As indicated below copies of this communication are going to 
all counsel of record. 
DRR:CSH 
Enclosure 
Hon. Michael Rodak, Clerk 
Supreme Court of the United States 
June 12, 19 75 
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CC: Ms. Elizabeth Levatino, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General of Texas 
Supreme Court Building 
Austin, Texas 78701 
Mr. Charles E. Williams, III 
NAACr Legal Defense Fund 
10 Columbus Circle 
New York, New York 10017 
Philip Crawford, Esq. 
1606 East 12th 
Austin, Texas 78762 
Oscar Mauzy, Esq. 
Suite 200 
8204 Elmbrook Dr. 
Dallas, Texas 75247 
R. James George, Jr., Esq. 
Austin National Bank Building 
-~ustin, Texas 78701 
Sant'ord J. Rosen, Esq. 
Director of Litigation, MALDEF 
145 Ninth Street 
San Francisco, California 94103 
George Korbel, Esq. 
EEOC Litigation Center 
Room 902 
536 South Clark 
Chicago, Illinois 60605 
Don Gladden, Esq. 
702 Burk Burnett Building 
Fort Worth, Texas 76101 
Albert H. Kauffman, Esq. 
MALDEF 
501 Petroleum-Commerce Building 
201 North St. Mary's Street 
San Antonio, Texas 78205 
I , 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
....,....., ~ o:·nu-~\:fv-n.~:' ll' np!' ,ll nmrv ~nnf 
';Wnslringhttt, :!D. <!f. 2ll?'~.3 
June 17, 1975 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 73-1462 - White v. Regester 
/ 
The attached letters represent the extent 





Ltr of June 12, 1975, 
fr Clinton & Richards 
Ltr of June 13, 1975, 
fr Don Gladden, Esquire 
June 20, 1975 
Ho. 73-1462 White v. Regester 
Dear Byron: 
'. 
Please join me ill your circulation of Juae 20. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/88 
cc: The Coilference 
-
~~~~tftt Qf!turlltf flrt ~ ~hdt.G 
'J.lrurfringbm. ~. <!f. 2!1 i!~ 
CHAMBERS 0": 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
June 20, 1975 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your circulation of June 20th. 
Sincerely, 
[,/VV' 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference ~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
-
Re: 7 3-1462 - White v. Re2:e ster 
Dear Byron: 
I agree with your proposed per curiam of 
today 1 s date. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
~n:pn-ttte <Q:on.rt of t4t ~trite~ ~tatts 
~asi!rttgton. ~. <.q. 2!lb'J1·.;!. . 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 73-1462 - \\7hite v. Regester 
June 20, 1975 
This case had been argued and a memorandum giving my 
views was circulating when we were informed that the Texas 
Legislature had passed a new apportionment statute creating 
single-member districts in each of the counties at issue 
before us. That bill is now before the governor and he has 
until June 22 to sign or veto. I assume that the bill will 
become law, and on that assumption the question arises as to 
the disposition of this case. 
In pursuit of this question, I should first say that 
I have been advised by my law clerk, the Library and the 
Department of Justice that Texas is not subject to § 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act. As you know, I had been proceeding 
on the contrary assumption~ (Texas is covered in the pro-
posed 1975 extension of the Act.) 
The problem is thus considerably simplified but not ---wholly solved. Section 2 of the new apportionment statute 
-----------states as follows: 
-2-
"This Act shall become effective kor the 
el~ctions, primary and general, for al~ repre-
sentatives from the places herein specified and 
described to the 65th Legislature, and continue 
in effect thereafter fo r succeeding legisla-
tures; provided specifically that this Act shall 
not affect the membership, personnel, or districts 
of the 64th Legislature; and provided further, 
that in case a vacancy occurs in the office of any 
representative of the 64th Legislature by death, 
resignation, or otherwise, and a special election 
to fill such vacancy becomes necessary, said elec-
tion shall be held in the district as it was con-
stituted on January 1, 1975." 
The Act also provides in § 5 as follows: 
"When this Act becomes effective, the Act of 
October 22, 1971, of the Legislative Redistricting 
Board of Texas apportioning the state into repre-
sentative districts, as altered by decision of the 
United States District Court, Western District of 
Texas, is superseded." 
There will not be legislative elections in Texas until 1976, 
and under the foregoing provision the old districts will be 
effective· until those elections take place. Section 2 
expressly provides that special elections to fill vacancies 
will be held in the districts "as constituted on January 1, 
---------------1975." Whether this reference is to the districts ordered --into effect by the District Court, as § 5 arguably would 
indicate, I do not know. 
In any event, I would let the District Court deal 
first with the impact of the new Act. Perhaps the following 




"We are informed that the State of Texas 
h as adopted new apportionment legislation pro-
viding singl e -member districts to replace the 
multimember districts which are at issue before 
us in thi s case. That statute by its terms does 
not become effective until the 1976 elections, 
and intervening special elections to fill vacan-
cies, if any, will be held in the districts 
involved as constituted on January 1, 1975. 
Rather than render an unnecessary judgment on the 
validity of the constitutional views expressed by 
the District Court in this case, which we do not 
undertake to do at this time, we vacate the judg-
ment of the District Court and remand the case to 
that court for reconsideration in light of the 
recent Texas reapportionment legislation and for 
dismissal if the case is or becomes moot. 
So ordered." 
~- '-{ ') 'w 
~.a elf; 
--· uuD~lce Brannan 
Mr Jv·· ·. · . u~~ce Stewart 
Hr. Justice Marshall 
.t..rr. Justice BlacJ:mun 
~ Justice Pow~ll 
~~. Justice Rehnquist ~-9--
~ -<2...-0 
1
From: White, J. 
1• DRAFT Circulated: ~ - ..=t...3 - 7.s-
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~rculated: , 




Diana Regester et al. 
On Appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Western 
District of Texas. 
[June -, 1975] 
PER CuRIAM. 
We are informed that the State of Texas has adopted 
new apportionment legislation providing single-member 
districts to replace the multimember districts which are 
at issue before us in this case. That statute by its terms 
does not become effective until the 1976 elections, and 
intervening special elections to fill vacancies, if any, will 
be held in the districts involved as constituted on Janu-
ary 1, 1975. Rather than render an unnecessary judg-
ment on the validity of the constitutional views 
expressed by the District Court in this case, which we 
do not undertake to do at this time, we vacate the judg-
ment of the District Court and remand the case to that 
court for reconsideration in light of the recent Texas 
reapportionment legislation and for dismissal if the case· 
is or becomes moot. 
So ordered. 
.f,!t.p!L'l:IU ~a-.:rl.O: tb;: ':.:n±ttb- .§faits 
} 1 rur!f.n-;t.o-n. ~. <!f. 20~-'t~ 
CHAMBE"'S OF" 
THE CH I EF JUSTICE 
Re: 7 3-1462 - White v . Regester 
Dear Byron: 
June 2 3, 1975 
I join your per curiam circulated today. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Wli te 
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